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COME NOW the Defendants by their attorney, N. George Daines of Barrett & 
Daines, and tender their Appellants' Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as 
follows: 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT: 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2, 
UCA 1953 (RepL Vol. 1992). Pursuant to Rule 42 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred this 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
First Issue: The court erred in instructing the jury that Defendants must exercise 
"greater care" and a "higher standard of care" because Angie Christensen was a child. 
Standard of Review: This is a legal question subject to complete and 
plenary review by the appellate court. 
Supporting Authority: Summerill v. Shipley, 259 Ut. Adv. Rep. 19 (1995). 
Preservation of Issue: Counsel for Defendants duly objected to this 
instruction prior //to its issuance to the jury. Transcript at 1317-1319; 1326-1329. 
The trial judge specifically stated that the objection was noted for the record. Id. at 
1319, lines 5-20. The Defendants' objection was that Plaintiff was not a child and 
no "higher standard of care" was required. Id. at 1317-1319. 
Second Issue: The court erred in permitting the purported expert opinions of Dr. 
Tullis to be introduced. 
Standard of Review: The qualification of an expert witness is addressed 
to the discretion of the trial court. The standard for appellate review is clear error. 
Supporting Authority: Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Preservation of Issue: Counsel for Defendants duly and repeatedly objected 
to the qualifications of this expert, the foundation for his opinions, etc. Transcript 
at 1065-67, 1070-73, 1077, 1080-83, 1093, etc. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
The Plaintiff, Angie Christensen, a fifteen year old minor, sued the Defendant, 
Belmont Springs Limited Partnership and its two general partners for a neck injury 
suffered during the use of a swimming pool slide. Complaint, Trial Record at 1. The case 
was tried to a jury. The jury apportioned the negligence 60% to the Defendant and 40% to 
the Plaintiff. Special Verdict, Trial Record at 553-54. The trial court denied Defendants' 
Motion for a New Trial in a Memorandum Decision dated March 17, 1995. Trial Record 
at 672-73. The Judgment was entered on April 24, 1995. Trial Record at 716-719. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The Plaintiff, Angie Christensen, injured her neck while using a public swimming 
pool slide at the Belmont Springs pool. At the time of the accident Angie Christensen was 
15 years old. Transcript at 1213. She was an athletic young girl who participated in 
various team and individual sports. Id. at 1238, 1240-1242. Angie was a member of the 
2 
school soccer team, was involved in snow boarding and rock climbing. Id. at 1243-46. A 
year after the accident, she resumed vigorous activities and as a part of those activities ran 
the hurdles and sprints as a member of the Logan High track team. Id. at 1259-61. She 
was a very experienced and excellent swimmer and a former member of a swim team. Id. 
at 1238, 1242. Her competitive training included various strokes and shallow dive 
starting. Id. at 1238-39, 1253-56. She testified that she had engaged in extensive 
recreational swimming and had gone down the slide at Belmont "a million times." Id at 
1239. She later characterized the "million times" as an exaggeration but admitted she had 
used the slide and other slides many times and was experienced in this use. Id. at 1240. 
She had frequently gone down the slide in a prone, head first position. Id. at 1217, 1246. 
On June 14, 1991, while using the slide head first, Angie struck the bottom of the 
pool. Id at 846. She exited the pool with some assistance from her mother. Id. She 
complained of a headache and neck pain and did not return to the pool. She remained for a 
few hours while the rest of her group swam. Id. at 847. Her mother notified the lifeguard 
that Angie had hit her head, but said that an injury report was not necessary as it was not 
serious. Id. at 848. On the way home Angie experienced more difficulty. Id. at 849. 
After returning home she finally went to Logan Regional Hospital in the late afternoon. 
Id. At that time a fracture of the neck was diagnosed. Id. at 850. 
Suit was filed against the Belmont Swimming Pool, alleging that the pool operation 
was negligent, specifically alleging that the accident was caused by low water level in the 
pool. Complaint, Trial Record at 1. The case was tried to a jury based upon jury 
instructions with a special verdict form. 
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The court gave Instruction #32 to the jury which was worded as follows: 
INSTRUCTION #32 
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED WHEN CHILDREN 
ARE INVOLVED 
A person must exercise greater care for the protection of 
young children than for adults. To satisfy this higher standard of 
care, a person is expected to foresee and guard against the 
ordinary, impulsive behavior of children. 
Instruction #32, Trial Record at 540. The court was using Standard Instruction 3.7 MUJI 
except that it deleted the word "young" as shown in the quotation. The Defendants timely 
objected to use of the instruction, because of the stated objection that Plaintiff was not a 
"young child" and the instruction placed a higher standard of care on Defendant than 
provided by Utah law. Transcript at 1317-19, 1326-29. 
During the trial, the Plaintiff called as an expert witness, Dr. Paul Tullis. Dr. 
Tullis was an expert in hydraulics and fluid mechanics, including the interaction between 
water and pipes, canals, spillways and dams. Id. at 1044. Defendants made repeated 
objections to the testimony of Dr. Tullis arguing that he was not an expert on the areas 
being testified on and further that there was an inadequate foundation for his opinions. 
Transcript at 1065-67, 1070-73, 1077, 1080-83, 1093. The court without addressing 
directly whether Dr. Tullis would be accepted as an expert on pool slides, allowed him to 
provide numerous opinions including an opinion on the ultimate issue that the Belmont 
slide was dangerous and unsafe. Id. at 1079, 1156-57. 
The jury rendered its decision finding the Defendant negligent and finding the 
Plaintiff contributorily negligent. The jury found the negligence attributable 60% to the 
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Defendant and 40% to the Plaintiff. Special Verdict, Trial Record at 553-54. Based 
thereon the court entered its judgment against the Defendant for the sum of $17,690.15 
general damages, $25,509.85 special damages, interest on the special damages and costs 
with a total resulting judgment against Defendant of $49,534.41. Id. Defendants filed a 
Motion for New Trial principally complaining of the erroneous standard of care embodied 
in Instruction 32 but also referring to the improper allowance and handling of the Dr. 
Tullis expert testimony. Id. at 605. The court denied that Motion, whereupon this 
Appeal was taken. Id. at 672-73. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT 
DEFENDANTS MUST EXERCISE "GREATER CARE" AND A "HIGHER 
STANDARD OF CARE" BECAUSE ANGIE CHRISTENSEN WAS A CHILD. 
The trial court erred in using an instruction which was for young children requiring 
Defendants to exercise greater care because the Plaintiff was not a young child but instead 
was a experienced, expert swimmer with special training. The error was material because 
it resulted in the use of an improper standard in a comparative negligence adjudication. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PURPORTED EXPERT 
OPINIONS OF DR. TULLIS TO BE INTRODUCED. 
The court allowed opinions from Dr. Tullis when he admitted that he had no 
expertise in the critical areas, that he had no experience and had not studied the literature, 
standards, or data regarding accidents from pool slides. Dr. Tullis testified on the ultimate 
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issue that the slide was dangerous simply because the Plaintiff was injured while using the 
slide. The information provided by Dr. Tullis was contradicted by the only study he 
referred to as a source. The court erred in overruling Defendants objections and motions 
to strike. 
VI. ARGUMENT: 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT 
DEFENDANTS MUST EXERCISE "GREATER CARE" AND A "HIGHER 
STANDARD OF CARE" BECAUSE ANGIE CHRISTENSEN WAS A CHILD. 
The principal error and the central basis for this appeal is the court's issuance of 
Instruction #32, "Amount of Caution Required When Children Are Involved." The Plaintiff 
requested this instruction. This instruction was slightly modified by the court from Standard 
Instruction 3.7, MUJI, in that the word "young" was deleted by the court wherein it was used 
as an adjective to the word "children" in the first sentence of the instruction. The instruction 
was given as follows: 
INSTRUCTION #32 
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED WHEN CHILDREN 
ARE INVOLVED 
A person must exercise greater care for the protection of young 
children than for adults. To satisfy this higher standard of care, a person is 
expected to foresee and guard against the ordinary, impulsive behavior of 
children. 
Trial Record at 540. Plaintiffs counsel highlighted and focused on this instruction in his 
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closing argument calling the jury attention to Instruction #32, as follows: 
Share that, read it, pay attention to it. It's a different standard than if it is just 
your next door neighbor. There is a different standard, a higher standard, 
for children. 
Plaintiffs Closing Argument, Transcript at 1343, lines 17-20. Defendants believe that this 
court must assume the jury did what the court instructed them to do and what Plaintiffs 
counsel argued for. The jury applied a "higher standard for children" to the facts in this case. 
A. DEFENDANTS TIMELY, PROPERLY AND SPECIFICALLY 
OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTION #32, CORRECTLY CITING THE LAW, 
Defendants' counsel first objected to the instruction in an informal meeting in the 
judge's chambers, arguing that no "young child" was involved as the Plaintiff was certainly 
not a "young child." The court agreed that the Plaintiff was not a "young child" and so the 
court directed that the word "young" be eliminated from the instruction. Defendant's counsel 
then renewed his objection that the instruction even as modified should not be given. 
Plaintiffs counsel argued that inasmuch as the Plaintiff was legally a minor, she was entitled 
to such an instruction. This discussion was off the record but this discussion was referred to 
on the record. Transcript at 1316-19, 1326-29. 
Subsequently on the following day, on the record, counsel for the Defendants again 
objected to the instruction. Id. Defendants' counsel argued that the court had actually 
compounded the problem by eliminating the word "young", for now the instruction didn't 
apply to just "young children" but to all children. Id. The original wording of the instruction 
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was directed to a subset of children, that being "young" children. Eliminating the word 
"young" broadened the coverage of the instruction to all children. The court's response was 
that in evaluating the conduct of the Plaintiff, the jury would have to use a sliding scale to 
evaluate her level of maturity and responsibility and that this instruction allowed that factual 
determination by the jury. Id. at 319. The court's reasoning that the jury was instructed to 
use a sliding scale is nowhere explained. No such instruction was given. 
In the specific case before the court, the evidence was that Angie was an "excellent" 
and a "experienced swimmer." Id. at 1238, 1242. Angie had visited the Plaintiffs premises 
frequently and had used the slide in question extensively, in her words "a million times." Id. 
at 1246. Angie was the epitome of an experienced, athletic young adult. She had specific 
training in racing dives into shallow water during her swim team training. If this young lady 
did not understand the danger of head first dives into shallow water, no one would. There is 
simply no justification for any presumption that she should be treated to a higher standard of 
care from the Defendants as a "young child." 
The effect of the court's ruling on this Instruction is to, in the words of the Instruction, 
place a duty of "greater care" and a "higher standard of care" on the Defendant. The jury 
must conclude from the wording of Instruction #32, that Angie is a "child" and the 
Defendants are required to exercise "greater care" and employ a "higher standard of care" 
wherein Defendants will "foresee" and "guard against" the [foolish] "behavior of children." 
Essentially what the jury was told is that Defendants had an obligation to foresee and guard 
against the foolish behavior of Angie. Such a standard might be appropriate for a young 
child who was injured by "foolish" conduct on this slide but it is entirely inappropriate for 
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Angie's foolish conduct. The Defendants' objections were timely, proper and specific noting 
that the instruction misstated the law as Angie was not a "young child" and owed no higher 
standard of care. 
B. THE INSTRUCTION AS GIVEN WAS INCORRECT LAW. 
The trial court made a critical error in instructing the jury. Indeed, the federal court 
has noted that the standards of care owed to young children, children, young adults and 
minors is well established law in Utah. Wright v. Marzo, 497 F.2d 907, 910-11 (10th Cir. 
1970). 
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court of Utah has considered the conduct of 
minors and the applicable standards for considering both their behavior and the duty of care 
owed toward them. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Nelson v. Arrowhead 
Freight Lines, remains the law of this State: 
It has been generally recognized that children of tender years are so 
far undeveloped as to be relieved of the charge of negligence; that during 
another period in their infancy there is rebuttable presumption against their 
capacity to understand and avoid danger; and that in the later years of 
infancy there is rebuttable presumption that they are chargeable with the 
same degree of care as are adults. Ordinarily a child under seven years of 
age is conclusively presumed not guilty of contributory negligence. 
Between the ages of seven and fourteen, in the absence of showing to the 
contrary, an infant is generally assumed not to have the same 
consciousness of danger and the same judgment in avoiding it as an adult. 
Above the age of fourteen, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, 
an infant is generally charged with having attained that development 
which imposes upon him the same degree of care as an adult. 
99 Utah 129, 104 P.2d 225, 228 (1940) (emphasis added). This quotation was cited as the 
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law of this State by Justice Stewart in deciding the case Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 
466 (Utah 1979). 
Essentially, we group minors in three separate classes as to both their standard of 
conduct, duties owed toward them and their capacity for negligence. Those classes are, 
"young children", using the Nelson delineation of children younger than 7 years of age. In 
this class, are that subset of children who are owed a "higher standard of care" and who may 
not be capable of committing contributory negligence. It is to this class of young children to 
whom Instruction #32 might be properly addressed. Even in this first class it is recognized 
that to some extent there must be a sliding scale of responsibility. For that reason in some 
instances Instruction #32 would be disfavored. The second class of children are those 
between the category of "young children" and the age of 14. In this category, children are 
evaluated on a sliding scale commensurate with their age, maturity, experience and general 
understanding. Properly stated, there is a rebuttable presumption that the higher standard of 
care might be owed. The third class of minors are those above the age of 14 to whom the 
adult standards of care are applied. 
The Nelson case discussed these three separate categories of minors and how the 
standards of care should be applied to each one. Those who are 14 and above the age of 14 
are presumed to be subject to the adult standards absent evidence to the contrary. The Nelson 
case cited extensively from Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 99(a): 
As to those over fourteen years of age the prima facie capability of 
negligence attaches. Each case must depend upon the intelligence and 
capacity of the child and the surrounding facts rather than upon any 
arbitrary rule. It cannot be said on the one hand that a child just past seven 
years is sui juris so as to be charged with negligence, nor, on the other 
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hand, that a child just under that age is wholly incapable of exercising 
care. It has generally been held that, since there is no exact period fixed 
by the law at which there is no doubt as to whether the child is sui juris, 
the questions of intelligence and ability to exercise care is for the jury 
under proper instructions from the court. But it has been held that, in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, a child fourteen years of age is presumed 
to have sufficient capacity to be sensible of danger and to have the power 
to avoid it. 
Nelson, 104 P.2d at 228. In this case, the trial court erred in the standard of care applied to a 
15 year old minor. There is a presumption that the ordinary standards of care should apply. 
Id. Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever that the presumption of ordinary standards of 
care and duty should not be applied to this young adult. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the standards of conduct in these 
three classifications without recorded deviation. As noted earlier, Justice Stewart quoted 
these standards from the Nelson case in deciding the Kilpack case. That decision was that a 
seven year old boy was incapable of committing contributory negligence. Justice Stewart, in 
so ruling, noted that adults had a higher duty of care toward such "young children." Kilpack 
604 P.2d at 464. In 1961, the Utah Supreme Court held in Mann v. Fairbourn, 366 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1961), that a five and a half year old could, given the evidence submitted, be 
contributorily negligent. In so ruling, the Court discusses Nelson and noted that the sliding 
scale could be applied to such a young child if the judge determines that the child could be 
negligent given his age and experience. Id. at 606. In Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., the 
Supreme Court again considered the capacities of a six year old in ruling that even a young 
child of this age has some duty of care toward himself. 397 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1964). 
Under this standard, there is still a higher duty of care owed to such minors. The Court in so 
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ruling, specifically noted that because of the age of the Plaintiff, the Defendant was held to a 
higher standard of care. See, e.g,. Donohue v. Rolando, 400 P.2d 14 (Utah 1965). 
In Morby v. Rogers, the Court considered the standard of care for a thirteen year old 
killed by an automobile driver while riding a bicycle. 252 P.2d 231 (Utah 1953). In that case 
it found that, given the age of thirteen, the jury should consider on a sliding scale the 
intelligence, knowledge and experience of the minor child. Id. at 234-35. In Carr v. 
Bradshaw, Justice Crockett referred again to the Nelson case in pointing out that "[t]he 
reason the court cannot say as a matter of law that a child under fourteen years of age is 
guilty of contributory negligence" is that it is a jury question thus referring to the sliding 
standards of age, experience and maturity for children under the age of 14. 464 P.2d 580, 
581 (Utah 1970). 
In North v. Cartwright, the Court considered the culpability of a seventeen year old 
and held that the adult standards applied, despite the minority of the seventeen year old. 
229 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1951). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considering Utah law, 
remarked in the Wright case that the law in Utah on this issue was that a fourteen year old 
will be held to adult standards of care. That case considered whether the court erred in 
refusing to give instructions very similar to Instruction #32. The court ruled that the refusal 
to give the instruction was not error inasmuch as the Defendant was 14 years of age. Wright, 
497 F.2d at 911, n. 7. The Tenth Circuit Court cited the various cases in finding that this 
appeared to be well-settled law in the State of Utah.. 
Each of the cited cases is decided within the framework of the Nelson case that 
special standards generally apply to young children under 7, and may on a sliding scale be 
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applied to older children 7-14. Above 14 years of age, adult standards should presumptively 
be applied. The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that these rules are well-settled 
law in the State of Utah. There is presumptively no higher duty of care owed to Angie. The 
Defendants did not owe her greater care and had no higher standard of duty to her. She is not 
within the class of children entitled to this protection denominated in the law, as "young 
children." In this regard, it is instructive to note that under the common law the term "child" 
was only applied to someone who had not reached the age of 14. Black's Law Dictionary 217 
(5th ed. 1979). 
In this case, the trial court had before it a 15 year old Plaintiff who classified herself 
as an "excellent and experienced swimmer." She admits numerous uses of the slide in 
question if not a "million times." She testified that she understood the difference between 
surface dives and penetration dives and the consequences of each in shallow water. She 
admitted that she had received special training in such diving as a part of competitive 
swimming. The use of Instruction #32 was clear error. 
C. THE USE OF AN INCORRECT INSTRUCTION AS TO STANDARD OF 
CARE IN A COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE CASE CAN ONLY BE CORRECTED 
BY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL. 
The initial inquiry must be to determine whether an instruction was erroneous, but 
that alone will not lead to reversal or a new trial if the error is harmless or inconsequential. 
Summerill v. Shipley, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (1995). In the instant case, there is no way the 
court can eliminate the effect of the erroneous instruction on the jury's decision making 
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process. The use of an incorrect standard of conduct inherently permeates the evaluation of 
relative responsibility between the two actors. If the Plaintiff, as stated by the instruction, 
was due a "higher standard of care," then the weighing and comparison of conduct between 
the two parties is inevitably skewed beyond correction. Id. There is simply no way at this 
date to determine what factor this was in the jury's determination. 
The effect of an erroneous instruction as to standard of care requires the court to order 
a new trial. In Summerill, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that: 
In a negligence case, such as the one before us, the standard of care 
defines the scope of the duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff. Accordingly, 
in all but the clearest cases, the jury's application of a standard less demanding 
than the law requires would necessarily be prejudicial. 
In the case at hand, we conclude that the jury was probably misled by 
the erroneous omission of the requested instruction more fully explaining the 
correct standard of care. 
Id. at 21. In this case, we do not have incomplete instructions, but an erroneous instruction. 
That is even more egregious. There is simply no way to determine and/or correct the effect 
of the improper instruction on the jury decision. A new trial must be ordered. 
In this case, it appears beyond question that an incorrect instruction was given and 
that the error was critical to the jury determination received. The Defendants duly and 
properly objected, repeatedly. The objections were on point and correct, the instruction 
requiring a higher standard of care should not have been given. Plaintiffs counsel 
emphasized the higher standard of care his client was due in closing argument asking the jury 
to "share it, read it, pay attention to it." Transcript at 1543. The court's striking of the word 
"young," rather than correcting the error, compounded it. A new trial must be ordered. 
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PURPORTED EXPERT 
OPINIONS OF DR. TULLIS TO BE INTRODUCED. 
The Defendants believe that Dr. Tullis was improperly accepted as an expert witness 
in this matter. Dr. Tullis had a definite area of expertise but that area did not include 
swimming pool slides. Dr. Tullis should not have been allowed to state that the pool slide 
was dangerous as an "established fact" because of Plaintiff s injury. That was an ultimate 
issue on which he was not qualified to express an opinion. The court erred in allowing the 
testimony and again in failing to strike the testimony once that lack of foundation was 
determined. 
A. DR. TULLIS WAS NOT QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT ON POOL 
SLIDES AND DEFENDANTS DULY AND TIMELY OBJECTED ON THE RECORD. 
On voir dire, Dr. Tullis admitted: (1) that he had done no studies on swimming 
pools or slides; (2) this was the first time he had ever examined a swimming pool slide; (3) 
that he knew of no standards for pool or slide construction; (4) that he had made no effort 
to determine whether there were specifications or standards or trade customs for pool 
construction or depth of water slides; (5) that he had not looked at any such standards and 
did not know if they existed; (6) that he had made no effort or search to determine if there 
were statistics on swimming pool slide accidents; (7) didn't know whether such statistics 
existed; (8) made no effort to determine if there was literature, journals or trade magazines 
which discuss pool slides; (8) made no observations of slides in the area or activity on the 
slides except that he has personally used such slides occasionally; and lastly (9) had not 
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even spent one hour reviewing the activity of swimmers in coming off such slides. Id. at 
1046-49. Defendants' counsel then asked whether experimental data or mathematical data 
was necessary to determine how bodies moved through the water. Id. at 1049-50. 
Counsel for the Defendants clarified the reason for asking if experimental data were 
necessary. If such data was necessary and no experiments had been done the expert's 
testimony would be improper. The court restricted this inquiry. Id. at 1050. Plaintiff's 
counsel asked Dr. Tullis if he considered himself an expert in the design and analysis of 
water slides. Dr. Tullis responded that he had never designed, made drawings or 
specifications of a slide but that "I feel like I am an expert in that area." Id. at 1054. 
The court without ruling whether Dr. Tullis would formally be allowed to testify as 
an expert witness proceeded to allow his testimony. Dr. Tullis provided a lengthy 
discussion of vectors, distances, and depths of theoretical swimmers or rigid blocks coming 
off a slide. Id. at 1058-63. Defendant's counsel objected that the testimony was not 
within the expertise of the witness and requested voir dire which was granted, whereupon 
the following discussion occurred: 
MR. DAINES: You're expressing an opinion about how a body goes 
off of a slide. Do you have any expertise in what a human body does off 
of a slide? 
THE WITNESS: I would agree that I'm not an expert in that. 
MR. DAINES: Pardon me? 
THE WITNESS: I would agree that I'm not an expert and 
probably shouldn't be giving an opinion on that subject. 
MR. DAINES: So the opinion you just gave is probably not within 
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your expertise as to what a human body will do off of a slide. 
THE WITNESS: Not as an engineer; but as a person with a body I 
think I know what my body would do. That's what my body would tend to 
do. 
MR. DAINES: . . . [H] ave you gone to a swimming pool where 
there's a slide and watched people for an hour go down that slide to see 
what happens? 
THE WITNESS: I've been in a swimming pool for an hour, but 
haven't had occasion to study that. 
MR. DAINES: Have you ever made an observation to see if this 
correlates with what you're saying about the human body and what 
happens? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Id. at 1065-66 (emphasis added). The court then overruled any objection saying that it 
would go to the weight of the testimony and he would not strike it from the record. Id. at 
1066. Counsel specifically requested that the opinions be stricken as they were not expert 
opinions and lacked proper foundation and the court stated that the objections were clear, 
on the record and were overruled. Id. at 1067. Dr. Tullis was allowed to continue 
providing just this type of testimony. 
B. THE COURT ALLOWED DR. TULLIS TO TESTIFY WITHOUT 
PROPER FOUNDATION AND RESTRICTED DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS TO 
OBJECT ON THE RECORD TO LACK OF FOUNDATION. 
counsel for Defendant objected to the foundation for Dr. Tullis to express opinions 
as to how the human body would move through the water. Id. at 1070-72. With no ruling 
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the court simply allowed the witness to proceed to express opinions on this subject with no 
foundation or basis whatsoever. Exasperated, the court instructed Defendants' counsel that 
"unless I [the court] say there's inadequate foundation, I'll allow Mr. Olsen to 
proceed." Id. at 1073 (emphasis added). Evidently, the court now assumed the task of 
determining foundational quality. Defendants' counsel did continue to object to testimony 
and the court continued to allow the same opinion testimony. See, generally, Transcript at 
1074 et.seq. The court would only strike answers if it determined they were expert 
opinions, other opinions were allowed. Id. at 1077, lines 11-18; at 1078 lines 12-15. The 
court noted in doing so that, "I don't think he's established anything that I've heard." Id. 
at 1078. Finally Plaintiff's counsel asked how deep the water needed to be for such a slide 
and asked if Dr. Tullis could determine that. His response was that this would be difficult 
and that he hadn't made such calculations and didn't consider that "necessary". Id. at 
1079, lines 2-12. He then described exactly what the basis or foundation for his belief 
was. Dr. Tullis testified that it was not necessary to do any calculations or verify his 
conclusions: 
Angie did it for me. She broke her neck and proved that it is 
dangerous, I guess. I was trying to determine why, not prove that it is, 
because that's an established fact. 
Id. at 1079, lines 21-24 (emphasis added). Defendants' counsel was instructed that 
objections to these opinions would go to weight of that testimony and can be dealt with on 
cross examination. Id. at 1080. The court stated that this testimony such as this was 
allowed because "it didn't require expertise." Id. at 1082. When Defendants' counsel 
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attempted to make a record of the various problems, the court instructed counsel that he 
"had done that at length . . [i]t is clear that you object." Id. at 1082-83. All of the 
objections and evidence quoted were presented in front of the jury. Later the court 
chastised Defendants' counsel about making objections or clarifying those objections for 
the record. Id. at 1093. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING CROSS EXAMINATION 
OF DR. TULLIS BECAUSE IT WAS IRRELEVANT, NOT NECESSARY OR WAS 
DONE WHEN DR. TULLIS WAS NOT PRESENT AND COULD NOT RESPOND. 
The defense began cross examination of Dr. Tullis by referring to his testimony and 
a Nova study he referred to in direct testimony. Id. at 1088 et. seq. Out of the hearing of 
the jury, Defendants explained their theory that the Plaintiff herself was negligent because 
she did an intentional maneuver off the slide, a head drop or vertical dive as she came off 
the slide which caused her to hit the pool bottom. That it was not the slide, but her act 
which caused the neck injury. Id. at 1100. Defense insisted that it was essential to cross 
examine to show that the Dr. Tullis testimony was in error and that there was a history of 
four and a half million sliders going down the slide without a neck injury. The Defendants 
were attempting to prove that Dr. Tullis was wrong in his assumption that sliders would 
enter the water and proceed at 32 degrees until striking their heads on the bottom. Id. at 
1001-02. The court instructed the defense that cross examination on these issues would be 
limited because it "will accomplish nothing" and the court did not consider it "necessary." 
Id. at 1104. Cross examination under these restrictions then proceeded. 
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Dr. Tullis reiterated his testimony that rigid bodies would enter the water at a 32 
degree angle and that was his "assumption." Id. at 1109, compare with testimony at 1060-
61. Dr. Tullis then testified that his assumption was that a rigid body would come down 
such a slide, enter the water at this angle and strike the bottom in four feet of water at 5.3 
vertical miles per hour. Id. at 1112. He indicated this was based on his "experience." Id. 
at 1112. When counsel tried to test this experience and assumption about what rigid 
bodies would do, the court interrupted, questioning the relevance. Id. at 1119. Evidently 
the court missed the point that Dr. Tullis had previously testified what he expected such a 
rigid, cylindrical body to do. Id. at 1063. The court sustained the objections and stopped 
this cross examination, evidently, because it didn't consider such testimony relevant. Id. at 
1120. This despite the fact that Dr. Tullis in direct testimony had testified that his 
calculations were that a rigid cylindrical block and/or a rigid swimmer would enter the 
water at a 32 degree angle. Id. at 1062-64. Defense then introduced the subject of the 
angle of entry for a rigid human body. Id. at 1121. Dr. Tullis after lengthy examination 
finally admitted that the Nova study, with a variety of angles, slide heights, extensions, 
etc., indicated that swimmers told to go down head first in a rigid position never went 
deeper than two and a half feet. Further that the angle was not 32 degrees and much 
shallower, in the range of 10 to 15 degrees. Id. at 1137. He did not explain why the 
experimental data contradicted his theories. A difference in the angle was such that at an 
angle of 10% to 15% a slider would not hit the bottom even coming into 2.5 feet of water. 
In further cross examination he admitted that angles of 32% could only be created in the 
experiment when expert swimmers were told to intentionally do a head drop off or vertical 
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dive off the slides. Id. at 1141. Again Dr. Tullis could not explain why it took an 
intentional head drop by an experienced diver to create an angle of 32%. This 
contradicted his hypothesis that a flat or rigid body would enter the water at this angle. 
Dr. Tullis admitted that everyone doing that head drop maneuver would hit the bottom of 
a four foot pool and that everyone doing a flat or horizonal dive would not hit the bottom. 
Later counsel asked Dr. Tullis if he would expect to hit his head on the bottom of a pool if 
he did an intentional head drop as he came off the slide. His answer was that he would 
expect to be hurt but many other people wouldn't know that. Id. at 1144-46. Dr. Tullis 
suggested it was not common knowledge that surface dives off a slide were safe where 
vertical dives or head drops were not. Id. at 1146. Dr. Tullis stated it was obvious to him 
but "don't say common knowledge because that means everybody regardless of age." Id. 
Dr. Tullis reiterated his position as follows: "I'm here to testify that there is a danger 
and she's [ Angie's] proof that there's a danger." Id. at 1149, (emphasis added). Dr. 
Tullis was later allowed to testify that the Belmont slide in his expert opinion was unsafe. 
Id. at 1156-57 (emphasis added). 
In this matter, a critical part of the Dr. Tullis testimony was his determination that a 
rigid body leaving the Belmont slide would enter and progress through the water at 32% 
angle and strike the bottom with its head at a vertical speed of 5.2 miles per hour. Id. at 
1001-02. That testimony was based upon his calculations of what a rigid body or a block or 
wood approximating a human body would do. He admitted that he had done no experiments 
and no observations in arriving at this conclusion. He had previously admitted that he was 
"not an expert in what a body would do once it left the slide." Id. at 1065-66. Still he was 
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allowed to testify on this issue. Subsequently the court restricted examination and coerced a 
stipulation from counsel so as to cutoff disparagement of the opinions of Dr. Tullis. The 
court did this by suggesting the testimony being obtained from the Nova study which 
contradicted Dr. Tullis purported expert opinions should just be stipulated to. The court 
cutoff this testimony and instead read this statement to the jury: 
None of the tests in the Nova study, using a rigid human body, were able 
to penetrate deeper than two and one and a half feet into the water and Dr. Tullis, 
yesterday's witness so acknowledged. 
Transcript at 1488. The method used by the trial court which cut short the attack on Dr. 
Tullis was simply unjustified and robbed Defendants of the opportunity to expose his errors. 
The trial court refused to allow the defense to continue the presentation of elements of the 
Nova study demonstrating that the angle of entry for rigid bodies was no more than 15%. Id. 
at 1483-87. The trial court would not allow evidence from the study because it constituted 
"long distance cross examination" of Dr. Tullis. Id. at 1479-83. Exactly what the trial 
court and counsel for Plaintiff found objectionable is nowhere better explained. Evidently 
the court considered any disparagement of Dr. Tullis opinions as an expert to be improper 
because Dr. Tullis had not remained in the courtroom: 
MR. OLSEN: I think it's really unfair to Dr. Tullis to attempt to cross-
examine him long distance. He can't now respond to questions . . . 
THE COURT: I understand that and that's my concern. I think we're 
using this witness to cross-examine Dr. Tullis. 
Id. at 1479. Nevertheless the court's statement constitutes a clear finding that the expert 
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testimony was in clear contradiction of the experimental data that the expert supposedly 
relied upon. The court actually found the testimony of Dr. Tullis incorrect on the ultimate 
issue that rigid bodies would strike the bottom of the pool. Defendant's counsel then asked 
that all of the Dr. Tullis testimony be stricken. The court refused. Id. at 1483. 
D. THE COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE THE QUALIFICATIONS 
OF DR. TULLIS TO PROVIDE THESE OPINIONS ON THE ULTIMATE ISSUES. 
It was the primary responsibility of the trial court to determine whether Dr. Tullis 
should have been allowed to provide his expert opinions. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 
P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). The trial court must determine the qualifications of the expert to 
give an opinion on a specific matter. Schindler vs. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 85 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion the trial court's decision allowing 
expert testimony will not be reversed. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
The rule is that an expert witness can provide an opinion on the ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact. Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence. However, this Rule is 
tempered by court cases which specify that before such an opinion on an ultimate issue is to 
be allowed the trial court must specifically determine the expertise of the witness, his degree 
of familiarity with the necessary facts, etc. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
1979). If the witness is not so qualified such an opinion should never be allowed. Id. 
In this case, the trial court allowed Dr. Tullis to testify on the ultimate issue, to wit: 
that the Belmont slide was unsafe and dangerous. He openly based this expert opinion on the 
basis that Angie had proven it dangerous because she was injured while using the slide. 
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Transcript at 1079. He was allowed to testify that it was an "established fact" that the slide 
was dangerous. Id. That is certainly an opinion on the ultimate issue. If Defendants were 
operating a slide that was unsafe and dangerous, a jury can be expected to award damages to 
injured people. This trial court allowed his conclusion that the slide was dangerous and 
unsafe because someone was injured. That foundation is simply inadequate for the 
expression of such an expert opinion on the critical issue in this case. The fact that an injury 
occurs is not in and of itself evidence that the slide is dangerous or unsafe. A careful reading 
of the Dr. Tullis testimony provides no other proper basis for this conclusion. 
E. THE ONLY WAY TO CORRECT THE PERVASIVE ERRORS 
RESULTANT FROM ALLOWING THE TULLIS TESTIMONY ON THE 
ULTIMATE ISSUES IS TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL. 
The qualification of an expert witness must be carefully scrutinized by the court to 
guard against persons who may give erroneous testimony or opinions without a sound 
foundation. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 342 P.2d 1094, (Utah 1959). The 
failure of a trial court to properly prevent erroneous or unfounded expert opinions is not 
easily corrected: 
Where a witness has testified in chief on the relevant question and it then 
comes out during cross examination that he or she does not have the requisite 
knowledge to establish competency, it is not sufficient that the invalid 
testimony simply be stricken out, for after the expert's testimony has gone to 
the jury, it is next to impossible to irradiate it entirely from their minds by any 
instructions or directions of the court; a new trial will be necessary. 
31A Am. Jur. 2d. §64 supra. 
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Dr. Tullis was never really qualified as an expert although the judge's overruling the 
repeated objections would imply that the trial court found that the witness was qualified. 
Where witnesses are offered as experts, their competency with respect to the special skill, 
knowledge or experience should be determined by the court as a question preliminary to the 
admission of their testimony. Brattv. Western Airlines, Inc., (CA 10 Utah) 155 F.2d 850. In 
view of those overwhelming admissions of incompetence in the particular area that was the 
ultimate issue in this suit. i.e. whether a swimming pool slide is or is not safe, it was a clear 
abuse of discretion for the court to permit Dr. Tullis to testify as an expert. This is 
abundantly clear when the "expert" himself admits that his real final opinion is based upon 
the fact that the accident happened and his only experience in the area is going down a few 
slides himself. 
It is therefore submitted that the error is clear and involves a misconception of the 
law. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. It was undoubtedly prejudicial since 
an unqualified "expert witness" testified on the ultimate issue of the case, i.e. whether or not 
the slide was dangerous. The Defendants' various motions to strike the testimony were 
erroneously overruled. Dr. Tullis may think he was using a layman's common sense but his 
testimony was not offered for that purpose and that was an area which should have been left 
to the jury. We have a hydraulic engineer attempting to be an expert on swimming pool 
accidents when he has no special expertise whatsoever in that area. The mere fact that he has 
studied and written about the behavior of fluids going through canals and pipelines has 
insufficient nexus to the issues in this case to allow his conclusions to be heard by the jury. 
This is particularly true when the conclusions, as admitted by the witness himself, were based 
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upon his common experience which was no different or better than that of any other person 
who has ever used a swimming pool slide. 
There can be little doubt that allowing the witness to testify as an expert when he 
admitted himself that he was not qualified, was not only an abuse of discretion but 
instructions that these objections should go to the "weight of his testimony" does not suffice. 
VII. CONCLUSION: 
Defendants request that the court grant a new trial in this matter on the basis that an 
error of law was made in the instructions given. Simply stated, the Defendants were 
burdened with a higher standard of care improperly. Such a handicap was contrary to the 
established law of this State. In addition, the Defendants urge that the trial court erred in 
allowing the expert testimony of Dr. Tullis. 
DATED November 16, 1995. 
BARRETT & DAINES 
N. George Dames 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY VITALE As Guardian Ad 




BELMONT SPRINGS, a Limited 
Partnership, WAYNE C. LARSEN and 
SCOTT C. HOLMGREN, individually 
and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 920000025 PI 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you 
find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find 
the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
"No." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Belmont Springs, negligent as alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes / No 
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as alleged by the defendant? 
1/ No ANSWER: Yes 
CawNoQZ-;te-OI 
K3 2{9y5 
4. Was the plaintiffs negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes * No 
5. If you have answered both Questions 2 and 4 "Yes," then, and only then, 
answer the following question: Assuming all the negligence that proximately caused 
the plaintiffs injuries to total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable 
to: 
A. Plaintiff, Angie Christensen V f l % 
B. Defendant, Belmont Springs hO % 
TOTAL: 100 % 
6. If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes," state the amount of special and 
general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries 
complained of If such questions were not answered "Yes," do not answer this 
question. 
Special Damages: 
Special Damages $ 
General Damages $ tyUxHi I 
TOTAL $ 7 ^ 6 ( 9 0 
DATED this &$ day of January, 1995. 
Foreperson 
-2-
HILLYA. J, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE(801) 752-2610 
BRIG 
"A;.< DJSTRH 7 
"» ft I is flj 'S5 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY VITALE, as Guardian Ad 
Litem for ANGIE CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BELMONT SPRINGS, a Limited 
Partnership, WAYNE C. LARSEN, 
and SCOTT C. HOLMGREN, 
individually, and DOES 
1 through 30, inclusive, 
Defendants• 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920000025 PI 
THIS MATTER having come on before the Court on the 
25th, 26th, and 27th days of January, 1995, for jury trial, 
and the Court having heard all the evidence, testimony, and 
argument, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
$72,000.00 was awarded by the jury at the trial referred to 
above. As the jury reached a verdict finding that 
Defendants were 60% negligent and Plaintiff was 40% 
negligent, Defendants are ordered to compensate Plaintiff in 
the amount of $17,690.15 general damages, $25,509.85 special 
damages, $5,711.41 interest on 60% of the special damages at 
10% per annum from June 14, 1991 to March 8, 1995, plus 
costs of this action in the sum of $ ^ 2 3 . — for a 
total judgment of $ */ *? jT3*/t Hi , to accrue interest at the 
legal rate of 9.22% per annum until paid in full, plus after 
accruing costs. The general partners1 liability is
 p M C\^.nA.7 
APR 2 5 1Q<K 
** As identified on Attachment. 
consis #nt with liability as determined by U.C.J 48-1-12(2) 
in effect as of June 14, 1991. 
1995. 
THE COURT: 
:iect as of June 14, iyyi. 
Dated this 2H day of Mafreh, 
// /U4 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY VITALE, as Guardian Ad Litem 
for ANGIE CHRISTENSEN, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
BELMONT SPRINGS, a Limited 
Partnership, WAYNE C. LARSEN, 
and SCOTT C. HOLMGREN, 




CIVIL NO. 920000025 PI 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
) 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to the Defendants' Motion For A New Trial. 
The Court has reviewed the motion, together with accompanying memorandum and the 
opposing memorandum of Plaintiff. Oral Argument was heard on March 8, 1995, at which 
time the Court took the case under advisement. 
The principle thrust of Defendants' Motion For A New Trial is directed at instruction 
#32, which was given to the jury, and which is MUJI Instruction #3.7 with the exception that 
the adjective "young" was deleted. This was a three day jury trial held on the first week the 
Court was operating in the new First District Court building in Brigham City. On the second 
day of the trial, specifically Thursday evening, counsel for both parties met with the Court in 
chambers, off the record, to review proposed jury instructions. This conference lasted from 
approximately 6:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. Plaintiff had requested that MUJI Instruction #3.7 
be given and Defendant strenuously objected. The Court indicated it intended to allow the 
instruction, but would delete the adjective "young" if defense counsel specifically 
Case N o . ^ ' ^ S ' k 
MAR 9 n 1QCK 
Memorandum Decision 
Civil No. 920000025 
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requested this deletion. Defense counsel, while objecting to the entire instruction, did 
request that at least the adjective "young" be deleted from the Instruction. The Instruction 
was thereafter prepared with that word deleted. On the third day of the trial, Friday 
evening, outside the presence of the jury, the Court reviewed with counsel the final 
Instructions. Defense counsel renewed his objection to Instruction #32 (MUJI 3.7). At that 
point, Defense counsel objected to the entire Instruction but insisted that at least the word 
"young" should be reinserted if the Instruction were to be given. At that time, the Court 
advised Defense counsel that the word "young" had been deleted at his request and the 
Instruction would be given as prepared. 
The Court has reviewed all authorities cited by Plaintiff and Defendant and has also 
considered the totality of the evidence including the entire package of Instructions. The 
Court is of the opinion that the Instruction was properly given, that the jury carefully and 
intelligently weighed the comparative negligence of the parties and that the Instruction does 
not constitute a basis for a new trial. 
As a second basis for a new trial, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Paul 
Tullis, was improperly allowed to mingle expert and non-expert testimony. The record 
shows without question Dr. Tullis was well qualified as an expert. Additionally, the record 
will demonstrate that there was extensive cross-examination allowed. The arguments which 
Defendants make in their Memorandum reinforce that effective cross-examination was 
allowed and that to some extent the cross-examination undermined the expert's testimony on 
some issues. While this demonstrates that the jury had to make an evaluation as to how 
much weight to give the testimony, it does not demonstrate the justification for a new trial. 
Finally, Defendants object to a statement alleged to have been made in closing 
argument by Plaintiffs' attorney. Throughout the trial, there was extensive reference to a 
"Nova" study. Defendants' counsel referred to this study in his direct and cross-examination 
at least as frequently as Plaintiffs' counsel. The study itself was not admitted into evidence, 
Memorandum Decision 
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and to the Court's recollection, the conclusions of the study were not admitted. 
Closing argument took place on Friday evening between approximately 9:30 and 
10:40 p.m. The Court does not have the benefit of a transcript of closing arguments and 
does not recall exactly what was said. If the statement as alleged in Defendants' 
Memorandum was made, it is the Court's belief that the statement, while not proper, 
constituted harmless error. The jury deliberated from 10:40 p.m. until 4:00 a.m. The 
verdict form shows that the jury quite thoughtfully and carefully negotiated its way through a 
series of issues in arriving at its final verdict. There is no indication that the alleged 
statement in closing argument had any impact on the outcome. 
The Motion For New Trial is denied. 
DATED this / 7 day of March, 1995. 
Instruction No. Q 0\^ 
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED WHEN CHILDREN 
ARE INVOLVED 
A person must exercise greater care for the protection of children than for 
adults. To satisfy this higher standard of care, a person is expected to foresee and guard 
against the ordinary, impulsive behavior of children. 
MUJI 3.7 
